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L lntroduction
The Attomey-client privilege protects from disclosure of confidential communications
between an attomey and his or her client. Attomey-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary
privilege.2 The primary justification for privilege is that it encourages the free flow of
information from the client to the attorney.3 Ifclients are concemed about lawyers reporting their
conduct to the authorities, then he or she is unlikely to disclose all relevant facts, and this makes
an attomey's job extremely difficult. In 1960, New Jersey passed statute $ 2A:84A-20.
According to the statute, "communications between a lawyer and his client in the course ofthat
relationship and in professional confidence, are privileged, and a client has a privilege (a) to
refuse to disclose any such communication, and (b) to prevent his lawyer from disclosing it, and
(c) to prevent any other witness from disclosing such communication if it came to the knowledge
of such witness (i) in the course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in a
manner not reasonably to be anticipated, or (iii) as a result ofa breach of the lawyer-client
relationship, or (iv) in the course ofa recognized confidential or privileged communication
between the client and such witness."a The only time this sacred privitege can be pierced is
I The author is currently a2LDay Student at Seton Hall Univenity School of Law. At the time
ofthis writing, the author had received the 2016-2017 Academic Excellence Award in
Professional Responsibility.
2 upiohn co. v. unired srates, 449 u.s. 383, 389 (1981).
3 Fellerman v. Bradley, 99 N.J. 493,498 (1995).
4 N.J. Stat. $ 2A:84A-20 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through New Jersey 2l7th Second Annual
Session, L. 2017 , c. 237 (except c.23 1), and J.R. 18).
contemplation of the parties at the time."3a Historicatly, attomey-client privilege was confined to
communications that are directly related to pending or anticipated litigation.3s
Up until 1969, the ABA Canons ofEthics represented the official position ofthe bar on
matters of ethics.36 In 1969, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.3T "As originally drafted, the Code provided that a
lawyer was permitted, but not required to reveal a confidence or secret ola client."lE However,
this provision made no reference in disclosing fraud by the client, so the code was amended.3e In
1974,lhe bar added the qualification "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication."ao The legislative history indicates that the bar intended to narrow the fraud
exception and enlarge the domain ofsecrecy.4l As this statute has evolved over time, the ABA
Committee of Professional Ethics has made it clear that the value of confidentiality takes
precedence over the truth.a2
ilL A Brief History of lYiretapping
Wiretapping has been around as long as the telegraph and the telephone.a3 After the
invention ofthe telegraph and the telephone in 1837, private detectives tapped wires for their
34 Id.
3s Id.
36 Id. at 1065.
37 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969).
38 Id. at 1066.
3e Id.
40 Id. at 1067.
4r Id.
42 ld.
a3 ABA Section of Litigation 201 2 Section Annual Conference April 1 8-20, 2012: The Lessons
of the Raj Rajaratnam Trial: Be Careful Who's Listening.
through the following exceptions: "Such privilege shall not extend (a) to a communication in the
course of legal service sought or obtained in aid of the commission ofa crime or a fraud, or (b)
to a communication relevant to an issue between parties all ofwhom claim through the client,
regardless ofwhether the respective claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos
transaction, or (c) to a communication relevant to an issue ofbreach ofduty by the lawyer to his
client, or by the client to his lawyer. Where two or more persons have employed a lawyer to act
for them in common, none ofthem can assert such privilege as against the others as to
communications with respect to that matter."s This means that unless the lawyer helps his or her
client cover up a past crime, or to commit an ongoing or future crime, their communications are
completely privileged, unless waived.
il. The History of Attorney-Client Privilege
"The law of attomey-client privilege is the product ofjudicial decisions, augmented by
statutes that usually incorporate the decisional law."6 The policy of attomey-client privilege
dates back to the 1700s.7 Even during this era, the privilege was created "to promote freedom of
consultation oflegal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal
advisors must be removed; and hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's
consent."8 During this time in England, there was a distinction between barristers and attomeys.e
The term "counsel" relerred to barristers because they presented the evidence and argued the law
in court, whereas the term "counselor" was used to refer to attomeys because they prepared cases
s Id.
6 Hazard, Geoffrey C. Jr., "An Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client Privilege" (1978).
7Id. at 1069.
8Id.
e ld. at lo7o.
for litigation, advised clients, and drafted documents.r0 In Spark v. Middleton, the lawyer was
required to testify to matters "he knew before he was Counsel, or that came to his knowledge
since by other persons, and matters which he knew ofhis own knowledge."l1 At this point in
time, privilege applied only to matters leamed while counsel.12 In other cases in this era, legal
advisors had to testift if it yielded the truth. In Radcliffe v. Fursman, testimony was elicited
from a witness who had acted as a legal advisor.13 During the trial, the testimony sought was
related to giving legal advice rather than the representation ofthe client at trial.14 The argument
against the admissibility of the evidence was that the communications were meant for "private
instruction and information only, in order to direct parties in the conduct of their affairs.. .no
counselor or attomey can be obliged, or ought to discover any matter which his client reveals to
him."ls The opposing argument was that disclosure of the testimony would yield the truth, and
the House oflords agteed, so this argument prevailed.l6 The truth was seen as more important
than attomey-client privilege.
ln 1743, the case of Arnesley v. Anslesea, nearly wiped out attomey-client privilege.rT
Both sides acknowledged the general principal of attomey-client privilege-that information
coming to the knowledge of an attomey in connection with the representation of a client is not
subject to disclosure.18 The dispute in this case focused on whether a more precise definition of
ro Id.
rrld. at 1071.
12 Id.
rr Id. at 1073.
14 Id.
rs Id.
r6ld.
r7 Id.
l8 Id.
4
attorney-client privilege would include or exclude what the attorney had leamed.le The plaintiff
argued that the information to be elicited from the attomey was not imparted to him in
connection with the pending litigation, the information was not essential to the matter in which
the attomey was consulted, and that privilege should not apply to communication revealing the
client's intention to commit a wrong.2o Conversely, defense counsel argued that all
communications between client and attomey are privileged, with some possible exceptions.2l
Ultimately, the Court allowed the testimony by the attomey to be received because the
communication was not necessary to securing the attomey's assistance.22 "ln other words, a
communication by a client to an attomey is privileged if it is directly gerrnane to securing
assistance in pending or prospective litigation, unless the litigation itself would amount to an
abuse ofprocess, but the privilege ceases to apply after the matter in question has been examined
al tial."23 This case established a very narrow interpretation of attomey-client privilege.
In 1833, attomey-client privilege received a redefinition that enlarged its potential
scope.2a In Bolton v. Comoration of Livemool and Greenoueh v. Gaskell, Lord Brougham held
all communications between the attomey and the client as immune from disclosure.2s To reach
this conclusion, he had to narrow the scope ofcase law, and completely ignored the holding of
Annesley v. Anglesea. Lord Brougham stated in Bolton: "lt seems plain that the course ofjustice
must stop if such a right [of discovery of submissions of counsel] exists. No man will dare to
re Id. at
2o Id. at
2r Id.
22 ld. at
23 Id.
2a Id. at
25 Id. at
1075.
1075-76.
1078.
1083.
1084.
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consult a professional adviser with a view to his defence or to the enforcement ofhis rights."26
This definition ofprivilege presents a value choice between the protection ofprivacy and the
suppression of the truth.2i Other English cases struggled with this dilemma as well. In, The
Oueen v. Cox and Railton, a solicitor was called to testify to communications with his clients to
show that a transfer ofassets was fraudulent, and the Court denied application of attomey-client
privilege.2s "The Court was careful to distinguish between consultations for the purpose of
receiving guidance to commit a proposed crime and communications after the commission of the
crime for the legitimate purpose ofbeing defended."2e
The first American case regarding attomey-client privilege was in the 1820s in Dixon v.
Parmelee, which endorsed the narrow view of attomey-client privilege under Annesley v.
Anslesea.3o Decades later, in Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, Chancellor Walworth concluded that
attomey-client privileged applied in a case regarding a fraudulent scheme.3r However, three
years later, Judge Selden relied on Annesley v. Anslesea to hold that attomey-client privilege did
not protect testimony from an attomey offered to prove that his client was an undisclosed
principal and as such liable on an obligation in favor of plaintiff.r2 The Court considered the
privilege inapplicable when the lawyer is acting as a business agent for his client.33 Judge
Selden's reasoning was that "originally no communications were protected except such as related
to the management of some suit orjudicial proceeding in court, then actually pending, or in the
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1087.
2e Id.
30 Id. at l087-88.
3r Id. at 1089.
12 Id. at 1090.
13 Id.
6
clients, and even businesses would tap each other's wires.4 State legislatures quickly noticed the
intrusive nature of wiretapping, and implemented legislation to prohibit it.as Whether or not
wiretapping was constitutionally permissible became an issue during the Prohibition Era.a5
"Despite the surge in crime during Prohibition, federal law enforcement generally disapproved of
wiretaps to obtain evidence in criminal investigations, and the Justice Department actually
banned the practice.aT Eventually in 1934, Congress passed The Communications Act of 1934,
which made wiretapping a federal criminal offense and made wiretap evidence inadmissible in
court.aE For the next three decades, wiretapping would remain illegal and a stigmatized
investigative technique.ae In the late 1960s, there was a shift in attitude towards wiretapping
because the govemment was struggling to enforce laws against organized crime and drug
trafficking.so Eventually, modem advances in technology, the govemment's increased ability to
intercept communications, and criminal prosecutions against white-collar crime such as insider
trading, evolved wiretapping into the laws that we have today.sr
U. The Intersectionality of lltiretapping and Attorney-Client Privilege
In recent years, wiretapping of criminal defendants has become more prominent in
criminal investigations. To prevent privileged communications from being used as evidence. in
1968, the New Jersey Legislature passed The New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic
4 ld. at2.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 3.
4t Id.
4e Id.
50 Id.
5r Id. at 5.
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Surveillance Act to prevent such recordings from being admitted into evidence. The act provides:
"Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or belore any court or other
authority ofthis State may move to suppress the contents ofany intercepted wire, electronic or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that:
o a. The communication was unlawfully intercepted;
o b. The order of authorization is insufficient on its face;
o c. The interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or in
accordance with the requirements of section 12 of P.L.1968, c.a09 (C.2\1!6,2\-
121'"sz
Under this Act, "no such interception shall be made unless the attomey general or his designee or
a county prosecutor within his authority determines that there exists a reasonable suspicion that
evidence of criminal conduct will be derived from such interception."ss Therefore, pursuant to
this Act, attomey-client privilege extends to wire-tapping. There is however, one exception to
this rule-New Jersey Statute $2A:156.{-11. This statute provides: If the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire, electronic or oral communications are to be intercepted are being
used, or are about to be used, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by, a
licensed physician, a licensed practicing psychologist, an attomey-atJaw, a practicing
clergyman, or a newspaperman, or is a place used primarily for habitation by a husband and
wife, no order shall be issued unless a showing that the licensed physician, licensed practicing
psychologist, attomey-at-[aw, practicing clergyman or newspapernan is personally engaging in
or was engaged in over a period of time as a part of a continuing criminal activity or is
s2 N.J. Stat. $ 24:156A-21 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through New Jersey 2l7th Second
Annual Session, L.2017 , c. 237 (except c. 23 1), and J.R. I 8).
53 State v. Worthy, 141 N.J. 368, 376 (1995).
committing, has or had committed or is about to commit an offense as provided in section 8 of
P.L.1968, c.409 (C.2A:1 56.4-8) or that the public facilities or the place used primarily for
habitation by a husband and wile are being regularly used by someone who is personally
engaging in or was engaged in over a period of time as a part ofa continuing criminal activity or
is committing, has or had committed or is about to commit such an offense.sa Therefore, any
wiretapping that contains privileged communications remains privileged unless the attomey is
helping the client in the commission of a crime.
In State v. Ates, a telephone call between a defendant and his attomey was recorded by
the authorities.ss The defendant argued that his right to effective assistance ofcounsel had been
compromised, and the indictment should be dismissed.s6 The Court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss, but held that the entire phone call between the defendant and his attomey was
inadmissible in court.sT The Court concluded that, "the improper interception of the privileged
attomey-client communication was inadvertent rather than intentional."58 The Court reasoned
that the State should have brought this interception to the attention ofthe Court, and since they
did not do so, the evidence was to be suppressed.se
Conversely, in State v. Sugar, law enforcement officers intentionally eavesdropped on the
defendant and his attomey and subsequently charged him with murder.60 The trial court
dismissed the charges against the defendant and held that the eavesdropping denied the
54 N.J. Stat. $ 2A:156A-11 (LexisNexis. Lexis Advance through New Jersey 2l7th Second
Annual Session, L.2017, c.237 (except c.231), and J.R. l8).
i5 State v. Ates, 426 N.J. 614,617 (Super. Ct. 2009).
56 Id. at 619.
s7 ld. at 626.
58 Id. at 633.
5e Id.
60 State v. Suqar, 84 N.J. 1, 5 (1980).
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defendant the effective assistance ofcounsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.6r The
Appellate Court reversed the trial court's finding and held that because the defendant did not
claim that his confidence in his attomey was impaired and it did not appear the trial strategy was
disclosed, dismissal of the indictment was not required.62 The Supreme Court ultimately
remanded for further proceedings and enjoined the State from conducting any grandjury
proceedings until the trial cou( ruled on the suppression oftainted evidence and witnesses from
grand jury deliberations.63 The Court reasoned that the appropriate remedy for official intrusion
of attomey-client privilege is dismissal of prosecution when the intrusion destroys the
relationship between the attomey and client, or reveals the defendant's trial strategy.a Since the
conversation did not reveal the defendant's trial strategy, the Court did no1 dismiss the
indictment, but remanded for proceedings to suppress the evidence.65
Similarly, in State v. Santiago, a court reporter was reassigned to another matter, and
while waiting for another reporter, conversations between the defendant and his attomey were
recorded on the courtroom's sound system.66 Defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the
indictment alleging that the right to a fair trial and effective assistance ofcounsel had been
compromised.6i The Court held that there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment because the
recording was unintentional.68 Since the recording was unintentional, neither directly or
indirectly State action, nor was there any transmission ofthe conversations to the prosecution, no
6r Id. at 9.
62 Id. at l o.
63 ld. at26.
u ld. at22.
65 Id.
66 State v. Santiago,267 N.J. 432,433 (Super. Ct. 1993).
67 Id.
68 ld. at 437 .
1l
prejudice was shown, and there was no realistic possibility of injury to the defendant.6e The
Court explained that: "Because intrusions into the attomey-client relationship are not per se
unconstitutional, establishing a Sixth Amendment violation requires some showing ofprejudice
in terms of injury to the defendant or benefit to the state. To establish a Sixth Amendment
violation, it must be determined: (l) whether the govemment's intrusion is intentional; (2)
whether the prosecution obtains confidential information pertaining to trial preparation and
defense strategy as a result ofthe intrusion; and (3) whether the information obtained produces,
directly or indirectly, any evidence used at trial or is used in some other way to the defendant's
substantial detriment."7o "A Sixth Amendment violation cannot be established without a showing
that there is a realistic possibility ofinjury to defendant or benefit to the state as a result of the
govemment's intrusion into the attomey-client relationship."Tl
In State v. Worthv, an informant recorded telephone conversations with defendant, which
incriminated the defendant in drug offenses for which he and his co-defendants were indicted.T2
The defendant moved to suppress the recordings, and the trial court granted the motion, finding
that the recordings were obtained in violation ofthe New Jersey Wiretap and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act.?3 The Appellate Court and ultimately the Supreme Court aflirmed,
holding that the Act applied in this case because the calls, although they originated from an out-
of-state telephone, involved conversations with a person in the state. Ta The Court explained that:
The New Jersey Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. $ 24:156A-3,
6e Id.
70 Id.
7r Ic. ar 438.
72 State v. worthy,
73 ld. a|379.
74 Id. at 380.
141 N.J. 368, 371 (1995).
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applies to the interception of out-of-state telephone calls when a person located in New Jersey is
a party, when the interception is undertaken for the purpose ofinvestigating criminal activity in
New Jersey, and when New Jersey law enforcement oflicers direct, or cooperate in, the
interception."Ts "The New Jersey Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Act), N.J.
Stat. Ann. $ 24:1564-21a, provides that an aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents
ofany intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the
grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted. If the motion is granted, the entire
contents ofall intercepted wire, electronic or oral communications obtained during or after any
interception which is determined to be in violation of the act or evidence derived therefrom, shall
not be received in the trial, hearing, or proceeding."T6
Based on the statutes and the case law, it is clear that the attomey-client privilege is
sacred, but unintentional violation of the privilege cannot be used as a sword to dismiss a
criminal indictment. This means that any conversation between an attomey and his or her client
are inadmissible in court, but there are exceptions to this rule.
V. Exceptions to Attorney-Client Privilege and The New lersey lYiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Conlrol Act
There are certain forms of communications that are not privileged between an attomey
and his or her client. New Jersey Statue $2A:84A-20 provides: "Such privilege shall not extend
(a) to a communication in the course oflegal service sought or obtained in aid of the commission
ofa crime or a fiaud, or (b) to a communication relevant to an issue between parties all ofwhom
7s Id. at 379.
76 Id. at 380.
l3
claim through the client, regardless of whether the respective claims are by testate or intestate
succession or by inter vivos transaction, or (c) to a communication relevant to an issue ofbreach
olduty by the lawyer to his client, or by the client to his lawyer. Where two or more persons
have employed a lawyer to act for them in common, none ofthem can assert such privilege as
against the others as to communications with respect to that matter."77
In State v. Terr.v, a husband and wife were charged with conspiracy to manufacture,
possess, and distribute drugs.78 The Appellate Court held that the Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act did not require a special need to wiretap a cell phone used by a married
person.Te The Court explained that interception in this case did not vitiate the marital
communications privilege because the statute provides that no otherwise privileged
communication intercepted under the Wiretap Act would lose its privileged character.8o ln
response, the trial court adopted a crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege
(relying on the crime-fraud exception to attomey-client privilege).El However, the Appellate
Court rejected this, explaining that such an exception to a privilege enacted by the legislature
could be added only by rule or statute pursuant to New Jersey's Evidence Act.82 The court
explains that, *N.J.S.A. $ 24:156A,-11 does not require a showing of special need to wiretap a
cellphone merely because it is registered to or used by a married person, even if the married
person uses the cellphone to communicate with his or her spouse."83 The court reasons that the
77 N.J. stat. $ 2A:84A-20 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through New Jersey 2l7th Second Annual
Session, L.2017, c. 237 (except c. 231), and J.R. 18).
78 State v. Terr.v,430 N.J. Super. 587, 589 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
7e Id.
80 Id. at 591.
8r Id. at 593.
82 Id. at 610.
83 Id. at 596.
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fact that the spousal testimonial privilege was at issue in other cases does not mean that the court
is free to create exceptions to other privileges.8a The fact that the Legislature codified a crime-
fraud exception to the attomey-client privilege does not mean that the court can add that
exception to the marital-communications privilege because the privileges are akin.8s Essentially,
the trial court did not have the authority to add the crime-fraud exception to the marital
communications privilege.86
In State v. Mazzarisi, the police recorded conversations between the defendant and his
attomey.8i The tape recording had occurrsd after charges had been filed against the defendant
when he appeared with his attomey to tum himself into the police.88 The Court held that when
considering the admissibility of a recording pertaining a partial omission olguilt, the trial court
must employ a two-part analysis: it must determine if the omission is unduly prejudicial,
focusing on the evidentiary purposes for which the recording is being offered, and if in its
discretion, the Court finds the omission unduly prejudicial, the Court must then consider whether
it renders all or only some of the recording untrustworthy, and suppress only the portion that is
deemed untrustworthy.8e The Court ultimately reversed the order dismissing the indictment
because neither the search warrants nor the indictment were based on any information revealed
in the conversation between the defendant and his attomey, and thus the Sixth Amendment was
not violated.eo The court reasoned that, "The State must be in no better position than it would
have enjoyed had no illegality occurred. However, even when there is a Sixth Amendment,
84 Id. at 610.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 State v. Mazzarisi,430 N.J. Super.433,438 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
8E Id.
8e Id. at 458.
eo Id.
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violation, the general rule applies that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. The role of
the exclusionary remedy employed by the Supreme Court in Sugar I is twofold: to vindicate
defendant's constitutional rights and to deter police from such conduct in the future. For the
prosecution to proceed, it must be carefully purged ofall taint from investigatory excess."ql
In National Utility Service. Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuits. Inc., the defendant (a corporation)
asserted attomey-client privilege, but inadvertently produced a copy of a memo from its in-house
counsel.e2 The memo stated that there was an existing contract between defendant and plaintiff.e3
The defendant filed an affirmative defense that there was no contract between the two parties,
and the plaintiff sought to retain the memo as a crime-fraud exception to attomey-client
privilege.ea The court found that the pre-litigation memorandum prepared by defendant's in-
house counsel to its controller was neither discoverable nor subject to use by plaintiff, under the
crime-fraud exception under the attomey-client privilege because it embodied advice
inconsistent with a legal theory later developed by litigation counsel.es The court reasoned that:
"The crime or fraud exception to the attomey-client privilege is interpreted broadly.
Confederating with clients to allow court and counsel to labor under a misapprehension as to the
true state ofaffairs; countenancing by silence the violation ofa court order and aiding and
abetting the continued contempt of another, are all frauds within the meaning of N.J. R. Evid.
a$Q)@). There is no reason to believe that the use of the word "fraud" in that rule is to be
er Id.
e2 Nat'l Util. Serv.. Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuits. tnc., 301 N.J. Super. 610, 613 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997).
e3 Id.
e4 ld.
e5 Id. at 619.
l6
limited to conventional notions of tortious frauds. Acts constituting fraud are as broad and as
varied as the human mind can invent. Deception and deceit in any form universally connote
fraud. Public policy demands that the "fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege as used in
N.J. R. Evid. 504 be given the broadest interpretation."e6 It further explained that: "The initial
reaction of in-house counsel cannot be deemed to bind the legal and factual contentions raised by
the attorneys retained to defend the litigation. The burden of establishing the elements of the
crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is upon the person seeking to overcome the
privilege. The person seeking access to the communication must present a prima facie case for
the exception to apply. The showing must be made by evidence other than the contested
communication itself."eT Essentially, the court held that the exception did not apply because the
memo was different from what the trial counsel asserted an affirmative defense arguably
inconsistent with the legal position embodied in the memo.es
Based on the history of the statute and the available case law, it is clear there are
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. In cases of inadvertent recordings, the prosecution is
unable to admit evidence from these recordings. Attorney-client privilege is seen as sacred in the
legal profession. While the policy justifications are clear-lawyers want their clients to feel
comfortable with them so clients engage in honest and open communication with them so
lawyers can zealously advocate on their behalfl---other concerns must be considered: Should
attorney-client privilege extend to unintentional wire-tapping? If an omission of guilt is recorded
inadvertently, should that be excluded from evidence? As lawyers, isn't it our job to seek justice?
Is it just to withhold evidence from the court that exposes the truth? The rest of this essay aims to
e6 Id. at 616.
e7Id. at 618.
e8 Id. at 619.
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answer these questions by analyzing and evaluating these questions through John Finnis' nine
principles of practical reasonableness.
VL Finnis' Theory of the Basic Goods
In Natural Law and Natural Riqhts, John Finnis acknowledges seven basic forms of
human good: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness,
and religion.ee Finnis explains that these seven goods are the basic aspects of well-being and
explain why we do something. He states, "From one's capacity to grasp intelligently the basic
forms ofgood as 'to-be-pursued' one gets one's ability in the descriptive disciplines ofhistory
and anthropology, to sympathetically see the point ofactions, lifestyles, characters, and cultures
that one would not choose for itself."l00 According to Finnis, these basic goods do not yet mean
moral good.l0l For Finnis, we need all seven ofthese basic goods to flourish as humans.
A: Lde
Finnis explains that the first basic value, is the value oflife.r02 According to Finnis, "life"
signifies every aspect ofthe vitality, which puts a human in good shape for self-determination.l03
Finnis explains that life includes bodily health, and fieedom from pain "that betokens organic
malfunctioning or injury."roa Finnis also includes procreation of children in this category.ros He
ee John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights 85-89 (oxford university press, Second Edition
201 l ).
roo Id. at 85.
ror Id. at 86.
102 Id.
103 Id.
loa ld.
105 Id.
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explains that, "We can distinguish the desire and decision to have a child, simply for the sake of
bearing a child, from the desire and decision to cherish and to educate the child. The former
desire and decision is a pursuit of the good of life, in are aspects of the pursuit of the distinct
basic values of sociability and truth, running alongside the continued pursuit ofthe value of life
that is involved in simply keeping the child alive and well until it can fend for itself.r06
In terms ofprocreation, the basic good of"life" does not apply to either attorney-client
privilege, or wiretapping. However, there is an argument to be made that attomey-client privilege
and wiretapping laws promote life because they shield one from confidential or potentially
incriminating evidence being revealed that can result in incarceration. Ifone is incarcerated, it
becomes very difficult to participate in the pursuit of life that Finnis endorses-a healthy
lifestyle, freedom from pain, procreation, etc. Therefore, there is an argument to be made that
both attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws promote the basic good of life by protecting
the client from confidential information being revealed to others that can result in incarceration.
B: Knowledge
According to Finnis, knowledge is considered "as desirable for its own sake, not merely
instrumentally."l0T Finnis explains that knowledge can be understood as "any proposition,
whatever its subject-matter, can be inquired into (with a view to affrrming or denying it) in either
of the two distinct ways, (i) instrumentally or (ii) out of curiosity, the pure desire to know, to find
out the truth about it simply out ofan interest in or concem for truth and a desire to avoid
ignorance or error as such.l08 According to Finnis, curiosity drives our interest in knowledge-it
106 Id. at 87.
107 Id.
ro8 Id. at 60.
l9
is "a name for the desire or inclination or felt want that we have when, just for the sake of
knowing, we want to find out about something."l0e Once we have an interest in knowledge, and
one reflects on this, Finnis explains that we understand that knowledge is a good thing to have,
not only for its utility, but "one finds oneselfable and ready to refer to finding ouL knowledge,
,rrrft as sufficient explanations ofthe point ofone's activity, project, or commitment."rl0
Therefore, Fimis ultimately concludes that the good of knowledge is self-evident-an aspect of
authentic human flourishing, and formulates a real (intelligent) reason for action.lll
Both attorney-client privilege and wiretapping do not promote the basic good of
knowledge-they actually hinder it. The doctrine of attomey-client privilege hinders knowledge
because the doctrine is designed to keep communication between an attomey and their client
private. For example, a client can tell his attomey that he committed a crime, and as long as it
does not promote an on-going or future crime, the attomey is obligated to keep this information
confidential, thus deterring knowledge of a situation. In theory, wiretapping promotes knowledge
because it is a recording of information being exchanged between people. However, wiretapping
evidence is usually suppressed, so the way the law is interpreted, it also deters knowledge
because it prohibits information from being presented in a court of law.
C: Play
Finnis asserts that the third basic aspect of human well-being is "play.'ttz He explains
that, "each one ofus can see the point ofengaging in performances which have no point beyond
loe Id.
rro Id. at 61.
rrr Id. at 64-65.
I 12 Id. at 87.
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the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake.-l13 According to Finnis, the performance may
be solitary, social, intellectual, physical, strenuous, relaxed, highly structured, relatively
informal, conventional, or "ad hoc" in its pattem. Finnis explains that "an element ofplay can
enter into any human activity, even the drafting ofenactments, but is always analyically
distinguishable from its'serious' context; and some activities, enterprises, and institutions are
entirely or primarily pure play. Play, then, has and is its own value."rla
The basic good ofplay is inapplicable in this analysis because neither the doctrine of
attomey-client privilege or wiretapping laws involve Finnis' concept ofplay. This does not have
a negative impact on whether or not these laws are viewed as "moral" because as Finnis
explains, not every moral act involves all seven of the goods.
D : Aesthetic Experience
Finnis explains that "many forms ofplay, such as dance or song or football, are the
matrix or occasion ofaesthetic experience. But beauty is not an indispensable element of
play."lls He distinguishes aesthetic experience from play, explaining that aesthetic experience
does not require one's own action.l16 Finnis states that, "what is sought after and valued for its
own sake may simply be the beautiful form'outside' one, and the'inner' experience of
appreciation of its beauty. But often enough the valued experience is found in the creation and./or
active appreciation of some wor* of significant and satisfting form."l l7
l13 Jd.
i Ia Id.
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The basic good of aesthetic experience is inapplicable in this analysis because neither the
doctrine of attomey-client privilege or wiretapping laws involve Finnis' concept of aesthetic
experience. As previously stated, this does not have a negative impact on whether or not these
laws are viewed as "moral" because as Finnis explains, not every moral act involves all seven of
the goods.
E : Soc iab ility (Frie nds hip)
Finnis states that "there is the value of that sociability which in its weakest form is
realized by a minimum ofpeace and harmony amongst persons, and which ranges through the
forms of human community to its slrongest form in the flowering of full friendship.ll8 He
explains that collaboration between two individuals is instrumental to the realization ofone's
real purpose.rre According to Finnis, "friendship involves acting for the sake ofone's friend's
purposes, one's friend's well-being. To be in a relationship of friendship with at least one other
person is a fundamental form of good."l2o
The basic good ofsociability, or friendship, is not applicable to wiretapping, but it is
applicable to the doctrine of attomey-client privilege. The purpose of attomey-client privilege is
not only to protect confidential communications between a lawyer and his or her client, but also
to implement trust in this relationship. If the client does not trust his or her lawyer, then they will
not be truthful with them, and ultimately it will be difficult for the lawyer to help his client.
Thus, his encouragement of trust allows the possibility offriendship between a lawyer and his or
her client.
IIE Id.
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F : Prac tic ql Re as onab le ne s s
Finnis defines practical reasonableness as "the basic good ofbeing able to bring one's
own intelligence to bear effectively on the problems ofchoosing one's actions and lifestyle and
shaping one's own character."l2l He explains that negatively, this is someone who has a measure
of effective freedom, and positively, this is someone that seeks to bring an intelligent and
reasonable order to their actions, habits, and practical attitudes.l22 According to Finnis, this order
has an intemal aspect such as when one strives to bring one's emotions and dispositions into
harmony and inner peace of mind, and an extemal aspect such as when one strives to make their
actions authentic-"genuine realizations ofone's one freely ordered evaluations, preferences,
hopes, and self-determination.'123 As Finnis explains, "this value is thus complex, involving
freedom and reason, integrity, and authenticity."l2a He explains this complexity by identifying
the nine basic requirements ofpractical reasonableness: (l) a coherent plan oflife, (2) no
arbitrary preferences amongst values, (3) no arbitrary preferences amongst persons, (4)
detachment, (5) commitment, (6) the (limited) relevance of consequences: efficiency, within
reason, (7) respect for every basic value in every act, (8) the requirements ofthe common good,
and (9) following one's conscience.l25 These requirements are very sigrificant, and will be
discussed in frlther detail belou,.
I will discuss practical reasonableness in relation to attomey-client privilege and
wiretapping in the next section of this essay.
l2l Id.
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G: Religion
Finnis begins this section by explaining, "for, as there is the order ofmeans to ends, and
the pursuit oflife, truth, play, and aesthetic experience in some individually selected order of
priorities and pattem of specialization, and the order that can be brought into human relations
through collaboration, community, and friendship, and the order that is to be brought into one's
character and activity through inner integrity and outer authenticity..."r26 Based on this order,
Finnis posits two questions: (1) "How are all these orders, which have their immediate origin in
human initiative and pass away in death, related to the lasting order of the whole cosmos and to
the origin, ifany, of that order?"127 (2) "Is it not perhaps the case that human freedom, in which
one rises above the determinism of instinct and impulse to an intelligent grasp of worthwhile
forms ofgood, and through which one shapes and masters one's environment but also one's own
character, is itself somehow subordinate to something which makes that human freedom, human
intelligence, and human mastery possible and which is free, intelligent, and sovereign in a way
no human being can be? Basically, Finnis suggests that we should be establishing and
maintaining a proper relationship between our self and the divine.l28
The basic good ofreligion is inapplicable in this analysis because neither the doctrine of
attomey-client privilege or wiretapping laws involve Finnis' concept ofreligion. As previously
stated, this does not have a negative impact on whether or not these laws are viewed as "moral,,
because as Finnis explains, not every moral act involves all seven ofthe goods.
126 Id. at 89.
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WI. Practical Reasonableness and Morality
Finnis explains that each ofthe seven basic goods can be participated in, and promoted in
an inexhaustible variety ofways and combinations ofemphasis, concentration, and
specialization.l2e According to Finnis, practical reasonableness is "participated in by precisely by
shaping one's participation in the other basic goods, by guiding one's commitments, one's
selection ofprojects, and what one does in carrying them out."l30 This concems what one must
do, or think, or be ifone is to participate in the basic value ofpractical reasonableness.r3r Finnis
explains that reasonableness is both a basic aspect ofhuman well-being and concerns one's
participation in all the other basic aspects of human well-being.r12 Also, "the basic forms ofgood
are opportunities of being; the more fully one participates in them the more one is what one can
be."l33 Essentially, practical reasonableness shapes our participation in the other goods, and
helps us choose what to do.r3a Finnis identifies nine basic requirements ofpractical
reasonableness: (1) a coherent plan of life, (2) no arbitrary preferences amongst values, (3) no
arbitrary preferences amongst persons, (4) detachment, (5) commitment, (6) efficiency, within
reason, (7) respect for every basic value in every act, (8) requirements ofthe common good, and
(9) following one's conscience. r35
r2e Id. at 100.
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l. A Coherent Plan of Life:
Finnis begins by explaining that "implicitly or explicitly one must have a harmonious set
ofpurposes and orientations, not as the 'plans' or'blueprints' ofa pipe-dream, but as effective
commitments.136 He explains that it is unreasonable to live moment to moment, to follow
immediate cravings, or to just drift.l37 Finnis gives the example of committing to the practice of
medicine or scholarship because they "require both direction and control of impulses, and the
undertaking ofspecific projects; but they also require the redirection of inclinations, the
reformation ofhabits, the abandonment of old and adoption ofnew projects, as circumstances
require, and overall, the harmonization of all one's deep commitments-for which there is no
recipe or blueprint, since basic aspects of human good are not like the definite objectives of
particular projects, btx are par tic ipate d in.t38
While both the doctrine of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws do not promote
a coherent plan of life for individuals, it does promote a coherent plan of life for the legal system.
The doctrine of attorney-client privilege creates order within the legal system. Ifclients do not
trust that communications with their attomey are confidential, then not only are they unlikely to
be truthful with their attomey, but they may not even consult an attomey at all. Wiretapping laws
also promote a coherent plan of life for the legal system because it allows people to trust that
their communications with others will not be used against them in an unfair, or unlawfirl way.
Thus, creating trust within our legal system creates order within the legal system. Ifpeople do
not trust the legal system or the people that participate in it, they will not respect the legal system
136 Id. at 104.
r37 Id.
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and it could fall apart entirely. Therefore, these laws promote a coherent plan for our legal
system.
2. No Arbitrary Preferences Amongst Values:
Finnis explains that committing to a coherent life plan will involve concentration on
some goods at the expense of others.lle According to Finnis, "the commitment will be rational
only if it is on the basis ofone's tastes. It will be unreasonable if it is on the basis ofa
devaluation ofany ofthe basic forms of human excellence, or if it is on the basis ofan
overvaluation ofsuch merely derivative and supporting or instrumental goods as wealth or
opportunity or ofsuch merely secondary and conditionally valuable goods as reputation or
pleasure."rao He explains that, it is one thing to have little capacity for goods such as friendship,
scholarship, or sanctity; but it is stupid or arbitrary to think, speak, or act as ifthese were not real
forms ofgoods.lal In other words, it is acceptable to prioritize some basic goods over others in
pursuit ofa coherent life plan, but we should not ignore other goods for arbitrary reasons.
Both the doctrines of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping ignore the basic good of
knowledge, but it does not ignore it for arbitrary reasons. Wiretapping laws promote the basic
good of life by protecting one's conversations from being used against them in court, and
through creating trust and order within the legal system. The doctrine of attomey-client privilege
values friendship over knowledge by prioritizing the privacy between an attomey and his or her
client over the knowledge that can be acquired Ilom those conversations. However, the reason
lor doing this is to promote trust between a lawyer and a client, ultimately creating order within
r3e Id. at l 05.
r10 Id.
lal Id.
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the legal system, so it does not ignore knowledge arbitrarily. Finnis explains that committing to a
coherent life plan involves focusing on some goods at the expense ofothers as long as we do not
ignore some ofthese goods for arbitrary reasons. Since the basic good of knowledge is ignored
for a rational reason-to promote trust and order within our legal system-Finnis would find this
to be morally permissible.
3. No Arbitrary Preferences Amongst Persons:
According to Finnis, one's own well-being should reasonably be the first claim ofone's
interest, concem, and effort, not because it is of more value than the well-being ofothers, but
because it is one's own.l42 He explains that, "the only reason for me to prefer my well-being is
that it is through my self-determined and self-realizing participation in the basic goods that I can
do what reasonableness suggests and requires, viz. favour and realize the forms of human good
indicated in the first principals ofpractical reason."ral Thus, we should not improperly favor
individuals, show unreasonable respect ofpersons, egoistic or group bias, or partiality opposed to
the Golden Rule.raa
Both the doctrine of attorney-client privilege and wiretapping laws do not arbitrarily
prefer some persons over olhers. Each of these laws are applied to all people equally-whether
one has an expensive, private attomey or a court appointed attomey. Thus, it does not arbitrarily
prefer some persons over others.
142 rd. at 707 .
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4. Detachment:
Finnis explains that "in order to be sufficiently open to all the basic forms ofgood in all
the changing circumstances ofa lifetime, and in all one's relations, often unforeseeable, with
other persons, and in all one's opportunities of effecting their well-being or relieving hardship,
one must have a certain detachment from all the specific and limited projects which one
undertakes.la5 In other words, no project should affect someone so much that ifthey failed at it,
there life would be devoid of meaning.la6 "Such an attitude irrationally devalues and treats as
meaningless the basic human good of authentic and reasonable self-determination, a good in
which one meaningfully participates simply by trying to do something sensible and worthwhile,
whether or not that sensible and worthwhile project comes to nothing."laT
Detachment is a difficult requirement ofpractical reasonableness to apply to the doctrine
of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping, but there is an argument to be made that these laws
include an element of detachment because they have exceptions. For example, the doctrine of
attomey-client privilege is penetrable if a client tells his or her attomey he is going to commit a
crime, and the lawyer reports it, this does not completely ruin the sanctity of the doctrine. In
regard to wire-tapping, proper protocol must be followed such as reasonable suspicion ofa
crime, and the proper authorities signing offon the wire-tap. Ifthese procedures are not
appropriately fcllowed, then the wire-tap evidence is inadmissible in court. These exceptions or
procedural safeguards are in place so that ifthey aren't properly followed, the doctrines or legal
system does not fall apart, and thus there exists an element of detachment.
r45 Id. at 1 10.
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5. Commitment:
Commitment establishes the balance between fanaticism and dropping out, apathy,
unreasonable failure, or refusal to get involved with anything.ras "lt is simply the requirement
that having made one's general commitments one must not abandon then lightly."lae According
to Finnis, one should creatively look for ways to carry out one's commitrnents rather than
restricting one's effort to familiar projects, methods, and routines.rso "Such creativity and
development shows that a person or society, is really living on the level of practical principal,
not merely on the level of conventional rules of conduct, rules of thumb, rules of method, etc.,
whose real appeal is not to reason but to sub-rational complacency ofhabit, mere urge to
conformity, etc."15l
Both the doctrine of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping meet the requirement of
commitment because these are sacred doctrines that are very difficult to penetrate. Specifically,
attomey-client privilege is seen as one of the most sacred doctrines within our legal system. It is
very diffrcult to get the court to agree to penetrate the doctrine of attorney-client privilege, or to
admit wiretapping evidence that was not obtained properly. The rules have been amended
multiple times to keep these doctrines relevant and applicable within our legal system, thus there
is a commitment to them.
r48 Id.
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6. Relevance ofConsequences: Efficiency, within Reason:
Finnis explains that this is the requirement that brings about good in the world by actions
that are efficient for reasonable purposes.ls2 He explains that one's actions should bejudged by
their effectiveness, their utility, and their purpose.l53 There zue many contexts in which we
should compare and assess the consequences of altemative decisions.l5a For example, it is
reasonable to prefer human good to the goods of animals, basic human goods to merely
instrumental goods, etc.1s5 Finnis states, "Where there are altemative techniques or facilities for
achieving definite objectives, cost-benefit analysis will make possible a certain range of
reasonable comparisons between techniques or facilities. Over a wide range of preferences and
wants, it is reasonable for an individual or society to seek to maximize the satisfaction ofthose
preferences or wants."l56 The significance here is not only in the choices we make, but how we
come to make these choices through our reason.
Both the doctrine of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws meet the requirement
of efficiency because oftheir effectiveness, utility, and purpose. Their purpose is to promote
trust and order within our legal system, even if the consequence of this is that communications
between an attomey and his or her client remain confidential. Finnis explains that it is not only
significant what choices we make, but how we make these choices through our reason. Since
there is a rational reason to have these doctrines and procedural safeguards in place within our
legal system at the expense ofcertain knowledge being revealed to the court, these laws can be
viewed as efficient and within reason.
rs2 Id. at 1l l.
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7. Respectfor Every Basic Value in Every Act:
Finnis begins this section by explaining that this requirement can be formulated in several
different ways.rsT The first formulation is that "one should not choose to do any act which of
itselfdoes nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation ofany one or more ofthe
basic forms of human good."r5E Finnis expressly rejects consequentialism, and explains that
basic values, and the practical principles expressing them are the only guides we have.lse He
explains that "ifone is to act intelligently at all one must choose to realize and participate in
some basic value or values rather than others, and this inevitable concentration of effort will
indirectly impoverish, inhibit, or interfere with the realization ofthose other values."r60 This
means that we must make our choices rationally, and to that, "reason requires that every basic
value be at least respected in each and every action."
Both the doctrines of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping respect other values
because there are exceptions to these laws. In general, these laws have procedural safeguards in
place that are meant to protect an individual, but there are limits. For example, I have discussed
how both attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws hinder knowledge because they allow
information to be kept from the court. However, these laws do respect the value of knowledge
because the law allows for instances where knowledge cannot be kept from the court. Ifone
plans to commit a future crime such as killing someone, then the exceptions to these laws allow
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for this knowledge to be revealed to the court. Therefore, even though these laws may not
promote knowledge, they do respect it.
8. Requirements of the Common Good:
There is a common good for human beings, and those are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship, religion, and practical reasonableness.16l According to Finnis, each of
these human values is a common good because they can be participated in by an inexhaustible
number ofpersons in an inexhaustible number of ways.162 Another significant sense of common
good is "a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value, for the sake of which
they have reason to collaborate with each other in a community."l6l
Both ofthese laws promote the common good because it gives people a reason to
collaborate with others in their community. For example, the legislature had to consult amongst
themselves in passing this law. Also, the doctrine of attomey-client privilege requires that
lawyers and clients collaborate with one another in working on a case. In regard to \i/iretapping,
police offrcers, attomey generals, and officers of the court must work together to properly
implement and obtain wiretapping evidence. These laws allow members of the community to
collaborate and atiain a reasonable objective.
16r Id. at 154.
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9. Following One's Conscience:
Finnis explains that one should not do what one thinks or feels should not be done.164 If
one has good inclinations-they zue generous, open, fair, and steady in one's love of human
good-then one is able to make practical judgments that reason requires.l65 Conversely, if one
does not have these good inclinations, then his or her conscience can mislead them, unless one
strives to be reasonable.l66 "Practical reasonableness is not simply a mechanism for producing
correct judgments, but an aspect ofpersonal full-being, to be respected in every act as well as
overall whatever the consequences."l6T
Following one's conscience is also another difficult requirement ofpractical
reasonableness to apply to the doctrine of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws, but
there is an argument to be made that since these laws have been around so long and have been
amended to keep them relevant, the legislature has passed these laws in good conscience and
continues to keep them relevant and applicable in our legal system with a good conscience.
10. The Product of these Requirements Morality:
"The requirements ofpractical reasonableness generate a moral language utilizing and
appealing to moral distinctions employed more or less spontaneously."l6E Each ofthese
requirements is thought ofas a mode of moral obligation or responsibility.r6e Each requirement
plays its part in reasonable decision-making, and thus are essential and necessary for morality.rT0
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Finnis would find both the doctrine ol attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws
morally just because they fulfill the requirements ofpractical reasonableness and promote many
ofthe basic goods. These laws are practically reasonable because they promote order within the
legal system, which can be viewed as a coherent plan of life for the legal system. These laws do
not arbitrarily prioritize some goods over others or some people over others, are efficient, respect
the value of other goods, and involve commitment and detachment. Even though these laws do
not promote every basic good, Finnis does not require this to be viewed as moral. Therefore,
since these laws promote some of the basic goods and are practically reasonable, Finnis would
find both the doctrine of attomey-client privilege and wiretapping laws to be morally just.
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